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Abstract. One of the most a!ractive, but nevertheless highly controversial proposals to 
alleviate the negative e"ects of today’s international patent regime is the Health Impact 
Fund (HIF). Although the HIF has been dra#ed to facilitate access to medicines and boost 
pharmaceutical research, we have analysed the burdens for the global poor a similar proposal 
designed to promote the use and development of climate-friendly technologies would have. 
Drawing parallels from the access to medicines debate, we suspect that an analogous “Climate 
Impact Fund” will increase the already very high scienti$c and technological supremacy of the 
developed world over the Global South. We advocate countering this dominance on the ground 
that countries with scarce research and development capacities will be in a di%cult position to 
reject technologies and will not have a say on how such technologies should look like. Further, 
addressing global hazards should be an inclusive endeavour and not only a privilege reserved 
for the developed world. Incentivizing grassroots innovation would be a major step to promote 
scienti$c and technological inclusion.  
Key words: technology transfer, distributive justice, health impact fund, development aid, 
climate change, priority, scienti$c participation.
Climate change is a major global hazard that di!erentially a!ects the regions of 
the world. While some areas will experience positive e!ects, such as increased yields in 
agriculture, the highly populated tropical regions will su!er negative consequences, such 
as a decrease in harvest yields and a wider prevalence of tropical diseases. Generally, a 
broad consensus holds that the current rate of greenhouse gases emissions cannot be 
sustained. Even if there is some scepticism whether catastrophic tipping points exist, the 
magnitude of potential hazards to life far outstrips the costs our and next generations 
would have to pay in order to mitigate greenhouse gases emissions. "erefore, we have 
strong moral reasons to give the bene#t of doubt to the existence of such tipping points 
and advocate concrete proposals that could foster mitigation e!orts (Singer 2004, Chap. 
2). In what follows, we would like to examine in how far the concept behind the “Health 
Impact Fund” as formulated by Aidan Hollis and "omas Pogge 2008 could be applied 
to the promotion of climate-friendly technologies. While earlier work (see Timmermann 
and van den Belt 2012) discussed some of the practical problems such type of fund might 
encounter, we wish to concentrate here on global justice considerations that have to be 
taken into account.
1] We would like to thank the participants of the “Global Justice: Norms and Limits” conference 
at the University of Bucharest (2012) for their valuable comments on our paper presentation. A special 
thanks goes also to &omas Pogge for his comments and criticism on an earlier dra# of this paper. &is 
article is the result of a research project of the Centre for Society and the Life Sciences in &e Netherlands, 
funded by the Netherlands Genomics Initiative.
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A$er a short discussion of (1) the moral justi#cation of the Health Impact Fund 
proposal, we will expose (2) that the fund might aggravate inequality in the distribution 
of research locations, (3) the reasons why such inequalities are condemnable, (4) that the 
a%empt to correct this injustice is more problematic than is apparent at #rst sight, (5) the 
special role grassroots innovators could play and (6) brie&y elucidate the con&ict that 
might arise in concentrating on mitigation e!orts alone while leaving adaptation needs 
aside.
I. INCENTI V IZING IN NOVATIONS
In accordance with Rawls’ theory of justice, we could argue that an intellectual 
property (IP) regime can be legitimately established if under that regime the least 
advantaged would be be%er o! than without such an incentive mechanism. However, 
this type of reasoning does not resolve the question in how far the industrialized world 
is obliged to institute an incentive regime that not just barely matches this minimum 
constraint, but up to what degree it should aim at increasing the position of the worst-
o! to the maximum sustainable level. Addressing this one question has become a highly 
polarized never-ending debate with a strong clash of diverse schools of thoughts. "e 
situation of not being able to #nd wide consensus for a clear answer has been aggravated 
by the fact that we cannot provide empirical evidence of how the well-being of the worst-
o! would change (or if it would change at all) if we had not the current incentive system 
for innovations in place.
In order to make today’s intellectual property regime of patents more acceptable 
to the worst-o! and to civil society in general, "omas Pogge and Aidan Hollis have 
elaborated a detailed proposal to redress its negative consequences. "e global extension 
of Western European, North American and Japanese standards of minimum recognition 
of intellectual property has increased the access and availability problems. Access to 
objects of innovation has become more limited, since the obligation of governments to 
recognize product patents (i.e. patents on the object itself, not merely the process by which 
it was produced) has limited the possibilities of generic manufacturers to develop cheaper 
alternatives to the original product for people with less #nancial resources. "e availability 
problem is indirectly increased by this global extension of standards, as companies 
all around the world can recoup their research and development costs by selling the 
products resulting from their investigations on the world markets. When a particular 
market can pay much more for its desired objects, this creates an incentive to satisfy this 
particular demand, leaving other markets with less purchasing power unsatis#ed.2 On 
the other hand, when a market is very poor and has di!erent needs, it will not be able to 
2] Here the high income inequalities come for the poor as a double penalty, they not only su"er from 
their limited purchasing power, but also from the rich being so much richer and thus a!racting nearly all 
research e"orts to satisfy their wants (cf. Pogge 2008).
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pay high enough mark-up prices to cover the costs incurred to develop the customized 
objects. When no third party jumps in, the research and development of the technological 
solutions needed may not occur and the products will never be available. 
A$er the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) 
agreement started to come into e!ect in 1994 universalizing the mentioned standards, 
generic companies that tried to #ll in a market gap by developing innovations speci#ed 
for resource-poor markets (such as single-dosage medicines) had to change business 
practices as selling reverse-engineered drugs became illegal. Now more than ever, 
companies all over the world focus on providing products primarily designed to meet the 
richer markets’ appetites.
As other incentives systems to promote research and development that be%er suit 
the interests of the global poor – we may think of prize-systems3 – are conceivable but 
have not been implemented, we can identify the current way innovations are incentivized 
as an institutional injustice. Arguments stating that countries voluntarily decided to sign 
the TRIPS agreement lose ground when we look at historical circumstances (cf. Drahos 
and Braithwaite 2003, Pogge 2008, and Singer 2004, Chap. 3). "e implementation of 
the TRIPS agreement is more a story of a reckless imposition of a treaty than a textbook 
example of good global democratic decision-making practice. Making available the 
necessary resources for establishing the Health Impact Fund can be seen as a compensation 
for having violated the negative duty of not imposing an oppressive regime on others. "e 
global trade regime, with its tari!s regulation and intellectual property rights standards, 
acts as an oppressive regime as far as competition possibilities for newcomers in the world 
economy go and the real prospects of using technology to address welfare issues are taken 
into account.
II. DISTR IBUTION OF R ESE A RCH FACILITIES
"e Health Impact Fund addresses the two problems of access and availability 
previously introduced. "e cost of medicinal treatment is o$en dictated by the sale price 
of medicines, thus reducing the price tag of medicines can make treatment more widely 
accessible. Pharmaceutical companies, holding exclusive rights, set prices and research 
agendas according to market incentives that are commonly driven by consumers’ ability 
to pay. "e idea of the impact fund is to o!er an extra incentive based on the impact the 
medicinal innovation has on alleviating the disease burden measured in its capacity 
to increase quality-adjusted life years (QALY). A company that has a patent on a new 
medicine will have the option to either exploit its exclusive rights in the traditional way, 
i.e. by maximizing pro#ts through sales or could commit to the proposed impact fund, 
selling its drugs at production cost and receiving a reward that would be dependent on 
3] Prize-systems reward innovators that $rst reach pre-speci$ed targets from public funds. For a 
characterization in the pharmaceutical area, see Love and Hubbard 2007.
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the drugs’ ability to add QALY anywhere in the world. If a company has a new drug that 
will primarily alleviate the disease burden of those who have less purchasing power it will 
rationally opt for the impact fund's reward.
"e main concern of the Health Impact Fund is to make medicines available to the 
poor. We can fear however that by focusing on this noble goal, the implementation of the 
HIF may actually undermine other human rights, particularly the right to share in the 
advancement of science, as speci#ed in article 27.1 of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (1948, henceforth UDHR). "e HIF uses the international patent regime for its 
goal of meliorating global health. Hence, it does not seek to abolish the use of patents 
for pharmaceutical innovations, as the proponents of the fund believe that the existent 
regime with a substantial addition (i.e. the HIF) leaves the worst-o! be%er o! than in a 
world prior to the TRIPS agreement (cf. Pogge 2009). 
A widely shared critique to the HIF is that the fund does not actively tackle the 
distribution of IP rights themselves.4 IP rights do not only give the possibility to exclude 
others from copying the product, but may also hinder research with the product. "is 
facilitates monopolizing follow-up research preventing particularly poorer competitors 
from entering the market. "e HIF would therefore leave the situation where research 
and development is almost exclusively done in the Global North unchanged, as it does not 
introduce additional incentives to remedy this inequality.5
Our concern is how far the HIF may use the patent system for its own purpose (i.e. 
improving global health) before becoming complicit of supporting the other inequalities 
brought up by the existing intellectual property regime. 
"e HIF seeks to make at least $6 billion additionally available to incentivize 
pharmaceutical innovation a year. "e companies interested in claiming those monies 
have to develop a new medicine. Given the way the fund is designed, there will be a 
stronger incentive to develop medicines for diseases that burden a high number of people. 
"is mechanism will favour research on diseases that are now a!ecting a huge number 
of individuals but for which no cure (or insu'cient remedy) is available – particularly 
widespread neglected diseases. Research institutes that are located in the areas where 
such diseases are prevalent (nowadays mostly the tropical region of the world) may have 
an initial advantage by having be%er samples of the pathogen, knowledge on how the 
local population has dealt with the disease, ties to the a!ected population and scienti#c 
expertise on the subject (cf. Timmermann 2012a). However, we should not underestimate 
the huge power the expensive scienti#c infrastructure located in the developed world has 
in a%racting the best researchers in the #eld, as well as its capacity to accelerate research. 
Even among research institutes in the developed world there is a #rm competition in 
4] &is criticism can be found in DeCamp 2007, as well as in Timmermann and van den Belt forth-
coming, but it is also a point raised by Knowledge Ecology International (see keionline.org). 
5] Further, the HIF only requires from industry to give up their price-se!ing privilege and not to 
surrender patents. &is is a concession made to industry in order to reduce the amount of money needed 
to create the fund.
Cristian Timmermann & Henk van den Belt 186
who manages to a%ract the best researchers with the most appealing start-up packages 
and cu%ing-edge facilities (cf. Stephan 2012). We can fear a further brain drain of the top 
scientists in the #eld of neglected diseases to the developed world.
An additional problem is that the HIF in its present form does not provide any 
#nancial assistance to help resource-poor institutes to carry out clinical trials on their 
newly developed substances, therefore they will have to rely on partnerships with 
companies that do have the #nancial means to further develop the drug.6 Here the terms 
of scienti#c participation within the partnership will end up being shaped by ideals 
of corporate social responsibility held by the stronger partner. At the end, the subjects 
of the right to share in the advancement of science will have to rely on corporate social 
responsibility to see if they will have a chance to participate in scienti#c endeavours on an 
equal standing relative to comparable merit. Reshaping an institutional order that clearly 
strengthens access to medicines, but leaves the ful#lment of the human right to participate 
in the advancement of science to the goodwill of companies whose behaviour is primarily 
moulded by market incentives, unavoidably entrenches a normative standpoint that 
advocates prioritarianism.7   
Another issue is the status of clinical trials as a private good. "e testing for biosafety 
and e'cacy represent the biggest expense in drug development, consisting in a huge 
hurdle that impedes most companies to bring new medicines on the market on their 
own. Treating clinical trials as a public good, would allow also small and medium-sized 
companies to develop new medicines (Reichman 2009). If the needed safety and e'cacy 
testing is publicly funded, many con&icts of interest could also be avoided. When stakes 
are so high for demonstrating success, scienti#c accuracy is at risk. Outcomes are prone 
to be biased, standards might be weakened by a favourable selection of patients for testing 
the compound and publication of unfavourable results might be suppressed or delayed 
(Reiss 2010, 431-33 and 439).8 Generic companies cannot rely on the data submi%ed 
by pharmaceutical companies to regulatory agencies before a speci#ed time (that varies 
according to drug type and jurisdiction) for the market approval of their drugs. In practice 
this can act as an extension of the exclusivity time, as most generic companies do not 
have the means to repeat the clinical trials in order to provide a new set of data to prove 
the already recognized performance of the compound in question. However, in theory, 
regulatory data shall only be protected from “unfair commercial use” (TRIPS, art. 39) 
– originally this phrase was de#ned in terms of misrepresentation (i.e. confusing and 
misleading consumers), but US and EU authorities illegitimately invoke this article to 
6] &e need to rely on foreign partners could be aggravated if high fees to be able to register a drug 
with the Health Impact Fund apply.
7] Here we understand prioritarianism as the position that seeks to raise the well-being level of the worst-
o", regardless if this comes at the cost of a lower aggregated welfare level for the global population as a whole. 
8] It is to note that the HIF provides an additional incentive for scienti$c accuracy as it pays out for 
measured health impact (in QALY) and not for claimed health impact. However making the public aware 
of long-term side-e"ects is still not directly encouraged.
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justify a new type of proprietary rights over the data on e'cacy and safety that companies 
have to submit to regulatory agencies (see Correa 2004 and Wadlow 2008). Generic 
companies are therefore compelled to present a separate set of data in order to gain market 
approval. In order to avoid “unfair commercial use” of data, repetitions of tests involving 
the exposure of human and animal subjects to drugs with no therapeutic or scienti#c 
intentions are deemed acceptable. Some duplicative work could be avoided with a careful 
dra$ of the HIF proposal, as companies can be asked to give up data exclusivity rights 
a$er the ten-year reward period.  
We have not been able to identify a clearer statement of what constitutes an 
“institutional order that is feasible” (cf. Pogge 2002) and one that is not. Drawing the 
line between “real-world” possibilities and theoretical feasibility, does not only satisfy 
philosophical cravings, but builds a solid foundation for follow-up political legitimation. 
As the natural rights basis of intellectual property is hardly tenable and other forms of 
incentivizing innovations are conceivable, a world without pharmaceutical patents is 
theoretically feasible. Some pessimism might be implied when stating that such a world 
is in principle politically infeasible. However one has to be quite blind to current-day 
political power plays to believe that a radical reform in how innovations are incentivized 
will occur within a relatively short time frame. Here is where the HIF gains much support, 
it has much higher chances to be implemented in a shorter period of time, as it constitutes 
only an addition to the current intellectual property regime and does not seek to build a 
new incentive system from scratch. "e implementation of the HIF does also not hinder 
people to continue advocating reforms that seek a fuller realization of human rights. If 
the HIF gains legitimacy as a temporary solution before a more fundamental reform can 
be carried out, it has to show that it will have a substantial e!ect on human lives before 
becoming out-dated – something that intuitively will be self-evident, but still may need 
a quanti#able estimate in order to contrast a scenario of inaction. For the arguments 
previously spelled out, we do not believe that the HIF is the best reform that can be 
conceptualized, however political realities make it a very good and feasible option that 
can be realised within a foreseeable period of time. 
Advocates of the HIF who accept compromise for the sake of political feasibility 
ought to admit openly that we should give priority to having a higher number of healthy 
people over having a lower number of healthy people with eventually more people 
participating in scienti#c endeavours. "is approach aims at minimizing su!ering 
related to disease while categorizing unhappiness due to lack of scienti#c engagement 
possibilities to a lower order of urgency. "is compromise has to also acknowledge that 
the duplicative work necessitated by the current proprietary regime of clinical data is 
morally acceptable in order to reach the higher goal of improving global health. "e fact 
that people who severely su!er from a disease cannot participate in science may help 
gather popular support for preferring one human right over the other, but if an institution 
formally acknowledges that it wishes to pursue one right at the cost of another, it will go 
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against the progressive realization of human rights and thus violate international law9. "e 
extra research money the HIF a%empts to a%ract will most likely not reduce the number 
of people who enjoy the right to share in the advancement of science in resource-poor 
countries, but there is no guarantee that it will not enlarge the distributional gap of research 
facilities between the developed and the developing world.10 History of innovation shows 
us plenty of cases where proli#c patenting at early stages of research has been detrimental 
for further product development – many such “patent thickets” have been avoided by 
prudent researchers, fewer are the cases where governments have succeeded in taking 
action (cf. Henry and Stiglitz 2010). Making research in neglected diseases pro#table will 
#rst of all create a race to the patent o'ces, restricting freedom to operate in the few areas 
where poorer research institutes could work with li%le fear of infringing patents.
"ere has to be a general awareness that spending less than 0,01% of the global 
income (calculated from Pogge 2009, 547) for an Health Impact Fund cannot address 
all major inequalities raised by the implementation of the TRIPS agreement, but merely 
constitutes a much be%er situation for the global poor than not spending that money at all. 
"omas Pogge 2011 justi#es his prioritarian position with an investigation on how 
nongovernmental aid organisations should allocate their limited resources. However this 
justi#cation presumes that actors cannot change the fact that the available resources are 
limited and thus are obliged to make sacri#ces in order to reduce the maximum amount of 
su!ering. Governments of larger economies or supranational bodies cannot use this same 
argument to justify a prioritarian position that neglects signi#cant e!orts for scienti#c 
capacity-building in developing countries in favour of improving global health as they are 
responsible for #xing the available resources for tackling injustices. Nongovernmental 
organisations (NGOs) have to justify “solely” what they have accomplished with the 
entrusted resources. Governments have to justify not only how they have allocated 
the resources collected, but also the amount they have found prudent to collect and 
the incentive systems framed. "e slightest appeal to maximize welfare improvement 
per euro spent globally (cf. Singer 2009) will fail to justify any accountability based on 
proportionality. On that account, a net o'cial development assistance that amounts to a 
0,32% share of the gross national income of the 23 Development Assistance Commi%ee 
countries (OECD 2011, 139) would hardly give a solid ground to morally justify this 
type of prioritarianism. A country like the Netherlands could #nance the HIF with the 
9] A comment on the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966, 
henceforth ICESCR) article 2.1 notes that “any deliberately retrogressive measures in that regard [i.e. un-
der the obligation of progressive realization] would require the most careful consideration and would need 
to be fully justi$ed by reference to the totality of the rights provided for in the Covenant and in the context 
of the full use of the maximum available resources” (O%ce of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 
1990, § 9). It is to note that a right to share in scienti$c advancement as spelled out in the UDHR, cannot be 
as clearly interpreted in the corresponding article 15 of the ICESCR.
10] An outline of how research and development facilities of multinational corporations are dis-
tributed is o"ered in von Zedtwitz and Grassmann 2002. An insight on how this distribution a"ects the 
propagation of climate-friendly technologies is o"ered by Sarno" 2011.
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current o'cial development assistance rate on its own, while Germany could pay twice 
the amount the HIF needs to start with its missing portion to meet the UN targeted 0,7% 
share for development assistance (data taken from OECD 2011, 140).
III. W H AT TECHNOLOGICA L SOLUTIONS SHOULD BE DEV ELOPED?
"ere are a number of reasons why poorer people should not be excluded from 
being able to develop technological solutions.11  Here we will discuss only one aspect: 
the lack of possibilities in in&uencing research agendas. Technologies are taking an 
ever more important role in our daily lives and participating in civil life without them is 
ge%ing closer and closer to being impossible. On a global level there is hardly a democratic 
decision-making process to identify which technologies should be developed and what 
form they should take. Today most of the research is done in the developed world. For this 
part of the world we cannot say that the development of new technologies underlies strict 
democratic resolution, but there is nevertheless a strong civil society in&uence by the 
o!ering of governmental #nancial aid to speci#c business branches or the development of 
products by direct request. Technologies that cause public controversies can be banned 
altogether, but this liberty can only be made use of when a country can rely on alternative 
products or can expect to be able to develop such alternatives within a time frame that is 
compatible with the public urgency the availability of such alternatives demands. Here 
is where this particular liberty is especially at stake for countries in the Global South, as 
they almost exclusively have to make use of technologies already developed by the Global 
North without being able to question the local acceptability thereof. 
Mitigating climate change with the aid of technology could be a much more inclusive 
e!ort than the ba%le against neglected diseases. When taking climate change mitigation 
as a global e!ort, researchers from poorer institutes could develop high impact solutions 
that do not necessarily rely on investigations made under an expensive infrastructure. "e 
technologies developed would still count as an invention, being a public good – thus non-
excludable and non-rivalrous in consumption – but will not necessarily have to continue 
with the trend of “complexity being be%er”. Technologies that might be easily copied and 
thus nowadays do not have enough market incentives to be developed since exclusivity 
cannot be made full use of in practice, could be stimulated by the climate impact fund’s 
reward system. 
Here we can di!erentiate between a core invention, which will be applying for the 
fund’s rewards, and subsequent local adaptation of the core invention. "e company 
that brought up the core invention will bene#t from the extra impact gained by the wide 
distribution of the invention and its local variation. When local variations have mutated 
11] It has been argued that intellectual property a"ects the diversity in research practices 
(Timmermann 2012b) and work in progress concentrates in how far the current IP regime limits (or fails 
to secure) human 'ourishing and development (Timmermann 2012c).
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to a new invention altogether, speci#c policies should be formulated to be able to draw 
the line between the new and the old product as well as to establish the fair shares each 
inventor should get.12 
A second argument concerns the possibility of raising the bar independently as a 
group. If a society is dependent upon the technological innovations made by others, it will 
have to subject itself to a level of risk toleration that it cannot in&uence. Risk a'nity varies 
among societies. Nowadays most countries do not have the infrastructure to develop 
alternatives or own solutions. In the case that prede#ned standards of quality, levels of 
toxicity or climate change mitigation targets are deemed unacceptable locally, poorer 
countries have no possibilities to take action and will have to content themselves with 
alien criterions. 
Finally, climate change mitigation is a global goal in which everybody should be 
able to participate as it counts as a worldwide hazard. Here access to the technologies 
becomes important on moral grounds. For example when insu'cient public transport 
infrastructure is available, some people will have no other option then to go to work with 
their energy-ine'cient car. In other cases technical solutions to allow poorer people to 
play a role in climate change mitigation are not even available. People should have the 
freedom to contribute to a good cause, i.e. mitigating greenhouse gases emissions, and not 
to be in a situation where they can only cause further damage to the earth’s atmosphere.
I V. COR R ECTING THE INJUSTICE
Subsequent publications to the 2008 Health Impact Fund proposal have dropped 
the strict patent requirement. "is was done mainly for two reasons, some high impact 
medicinal improvements are not patentable (cf. Syed 2009) and the potential of traditional 
medicine can play an enormous role for global health and therefore has also to be harnessed 
(Mendel and Hollis 2010). "e current version of the proposal, Hollis and Pogge 2009, 
suggests that researchers who gain the approval of a major regulatory agency, e.g. the U.S. 
Food and Drug Administration (FDA), should be eligible to receive the fund’s rewards. 
Herewith we have a slightly wider opening of the ‘#lter’ that decides which innovations 
can apply for HIF rewards and which not, as more innovations will qualify. "e contour 
of this ‘#lter’ does not only de#ne the hurdle that actors will have to pass in order to receive 
the reward, but if shaped di!erently will also change the spectrum of actors a%racted to 
the fund’s rewards. Making the circle of potential applicants less exclusive will stimulate 
a higher competition among applicants to the fund. As the reward rate is self-adjusted by 
competition (Hollis and Pogge 2008, 23), participating companies will have an economic 
interest not to have the rules of the game changed a$er the fund comes into existence. 
12] &e HIF mechanism makes the development of “me-too” drugs (i.e. drugs that have no sub-
stantial bene$ts over existing medicines to treat a particular disease) not lucrative. While this makes sense 
for diseases, the existence of me-too products to mitigate climate change has to be judged using di"erent 
parameters and taking a wider scope of social implications into consideration. 
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When we make it possible to reach the target (maximizing QALY) by more means we 
will increase the number of potential competitors and thus drive down the size of the 
reward.13 Making the HIF rewards accessible for new competitors will primarily hurt the 
established large corporations mostly headquartered in the potential donor countries, 
something that small and medium-sized companies around the world will welcome, but 
which may provoke resistance from major business lobbies. 
"ere is also another political catch, however, in dropping the strict patent 
requirement for HIF eligibility and se%ling for approval by a major regulatory agency 
alone. In the la%er case, a company could be asked to give up some of the exclusive rights 
that derive from its proprietary control of the regulatory data in exchange for becoming 
eligible for the HIF rewards. "e catch is that this might indirectly reinforce the 
international legitimacy of the principle of “data exclusivity” allegedly based on article 39 
of the TRIPS Agreement, a principle that is currently being promoted by the US and the 
EU but that is #ercely resisted by India and other developing countries. "e HIF could 
thus be seen as implicitly taking sides (and even the ‘wrong’ side) on this contentious 
issue.
Since especially in the case of climate-friendly technologies many non-patentable 
but high-impact innovations may emerge, the relaxation of the patent requirement 
deserves further elaboration.
It is in the public interest that a medicine has been approved by a regulatory agency 
for e'cacy and safety. We can say that loosing up this requirement for any purpose 
whatsoever not only contradicts public interest, but may also jeopardize the health of 
people who are relying on the claimed bene#ts of the medicine in question. A Health 
Impact Fund that will not demand such safety tests will not do justice to its name. However 
this limits “impacting” global health to medicinal innovation and the making available of 
new drugs, leaving other ways to improve health unrewarded by the fund. "ere is a very 
good reason to concentrate on the development of medicines: the knowledge involved 
in their making is a public good. As a public good it is non-rivalrous in consumption – a 
welfare improvement that will survive wars and civil unrest. Medicinal treatments and 
cures can play a key role when natural or human disasters occur, as diseases that spread 
out by the collapse of infrastructure, overcrowded con#nement of people and rape, can 
be controlled. As no society can completely insulate itself from such vulnerabilities, 
preventive measures for disease control can never do the full job. 
13] &e exceptional success of one candidate drug can also a"ect considerably the expected pay-out 
for other participating companies. &e HIF considers having a pay-out ceiling for a single drug (Hollis and 
Pogge 2008, 20). A minimum pay-out rate per QALY added could reduce uncertainties if clearly $xed. 
Designing the HIF with a self-adjusting pay-out rate comes with the price that every change in the scope 
of inventions that are allowed to apply for the fund’s reward will encounter strong resistance with people 
having already products destined for the HIF in their research pipeline. 
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As far as a Climate Impact Fund is concerned, regulatory approval plays a far lesser 
role.14 It is easier to estimate the di!erence in emission output a new technology may have 
over an older one, than it is to measure the e'cacy a drug has on combating a disease. "e 
distribution of the innovation landscape has the potential of being much more dispersed 
than in the area of medicinal innovation, as a lesser minimum infrastructure is required. 
However there is a fundamental di!erence between climate-friendly technologies and 
medicines: the harm caused by manufacturing the products of innovation may supersede 
the claimed bene#ts. Estimating the total emissions caused by making the product 
available on a massive scale is a quite challenging undertaking. "e debate around 
biofuels has become a classic example. "erefore, some kind of hurdle to be able to apply 
for a Climate Impact Fund’s reward seems also necessary. Some kind of certi#cation 
body similar to the Technischer Überwachungs-Verein (TÜV) will be needed to set 
the standard of what kind of innovations could apply for the rewards. "e selection of 
technologies will probably have to be limited to technologies whose total environmental 
production costs can be reasonably measured. "e reward has to be #xed in relation to 
the total impact the technology has (reduction of emissions minus additional emissions 
caused by production and operation). To make the climate impact measurement cost-
e!ective, we may not only have to restrict the types of technologies that can opt for the 
fund’s rewards, but also demand a fairly speci#c standard in homogeneity of the objects 
of innovation. 
Shi$ing the threshold line from having a patent with FDA approval to having FDA 
approval alone for eligibility for the Health Impact Fund may change fundamentally how 
the fund is perceived. "e basic mechanism of the impact fund relies on an exchange. 
Innovators have to give up some type of exclusivity, mainly price-se%ing privileges 
facilitated by patents or by being the sole “owner” of clinical trials data, in order to be 
eligible to apply for the fund’s rewards. Now, for the sake of the argument, let us imagine 
that a philanthropic organization systematically undertakes clinical trials to show the 
e'cacy of traditional medicine. "is organization applies for the fund’s rewards for no 
other reason than to give the indigenous communities that brought up the traditional 
medicine the entire impact fund’s reward monies. "e decision is based solely on notions 
of desert – the indigenous community created a public good, a gi$ to society, something 
that has to be reciprocated. 
In the case of medicines, this case might be nothing more than a thought 
experiment, due to the high costs of running clinical trials. While considering climate-
friendly technologies, this possibility ceases to be utopian, as certi#cation costs may only 
be minor. "ere might be some cases where the impact fund may have the possibility to 
14] Regulatory approval might also be relevant for new agrochemicals and new agricultural crops 
which could potentially play a role in climate mitigation. Data exclusivity is not only claimed for medicines 
but also for agrochemicals, as the la!er are also mentioned in article 39 of the TRIPS Agreement. Agri-biotech 
companies would also like to see regulatory data on the biosafety of GM crops being treated as proprietary. 
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reciprocate such kinds of gi$s to society. Now having the possibility to do so and choosing 
not to, demands a justi#cation. If the invention happened to enter directly into the 
public domain, should the impact fund reward the inventor solely on notions of desert? 
Does society want to use the scarce resources for addressing global hazards to reward 
something that is already in the public domain? A Maussean conception of gi$s clearly 
demands some kind of reciprocity. Forgoing the possibility to reciprocating such gi$s will 
send a very particular message on how society perceives them. Prioritizing the creation of 
new tools to combat current global hazards could count as a strong argument, but as we 
are conceptualizing a global solution we should not underestimate the social importance 
the reciprocation of gi$s has for some societies in our world. 
V. H A R NESSING THE POTENTI A L OF GR ASSROOTS IN NOVATOR S
It has been suggested that the possibility to adapt an invention to local needs and 
even to be able to build an equivalent using local resources is vital for distributing it to 
areas where the market does not have its expected e!ect (cf. Gupta 2010). When climate 
change mitigation is the central goal, there are limitations (at least economic limitations) 
to what we can reach with the help of standardized highly technological inventions. "e 
huge inequalities in the world limit access to the objects of innovation and the diversity 
in educational backgrounds may hinder the e!ective use of standardized inventions in all 
corners of the world. 
We may think of the newest generation of light bulbs showing great e'ciency in 
energy saving. "ose bulbs are expensive to acquire and require special environmentally 
safe disposal. In how far the next generation of light bulbs can take into account the 
purchasing power of the poorest half of the planet, as well as its recycling limitations, 
remains open, but there is some justi#ed scepticism on how far development further down 
this road will be as cost-e!ective as a strategy that aims at a diversi#cation of innovation 
projects. "ere are a number of inventions that can be amended according to local needs 
or can be locally reproduced. 
By contrast, the knowledge involved in a method to convert agricultural waste into 
a soil enhancer, biochar, does not only add to climate change mitigation e!orts but can 
also play an important role for food security.15 If the method is taught to farmers in remote 
areas, many could develop variations thereof to adapt to the local environment and 
through a process of trial and error keep improving local variations. People developing 
particularly successful variations could be incentivized to teach other communities about 
their skills. 
15] An extensive presentation of the popular reception of biochar is o"ered in www.biochar-inter-
national.org. A brief historical introduction as well as a sketch of problems that have to be overcome for a 
wider use in East Africa is presented by N. Hagemann 2012.
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V I. CON FLICTS OF LE AV ING A DA PTATION NEEDS A SIDE
In an earlier sketch of the practical problems of a Climate Impact Fund (CIF), namely 
Timmermann and van den Belt 2012, we came to the conclusion that such a fund would 
only be feasible and cost-e!ective if it concentrates on incentivizing technologies that 
can be assessed by a broad across-the-board metric (in close analogy to how the original 
HIF uses the QALY metric [Hollis and Pogge 2008, Chap. 3]). "erefore a CIF should 
concentrate, at least in its initial stage, on climate change mitigation only. At least for 
some technologies we can measure its relative improvement in reduction of greenhouse 
gases emissions to existing technologies, as mention earlier. Constructing a broad metric 
for climate change adaptation will be close to impossible due to the heterogeneity of the 
various coping strategies. 
"is whole path will lead inevitably to a series of disputes. Firstly, it is far from self-
evident that choosing a metric for its simplicity will provide a su'cient justi#cation for 
its implementation. Focusing on lowering the carbon footprint might undermine other 
very important goals such as maintaining biodiversity, recovering green areas, changing 
to more sustainable food consumption, etc. Secondly, a major initiative that concentrates 
solely on mitigation e!orts, may lead to neglecting the importance of adaptation needs. 
Here we should not forget that bene#ts gained by climate change mitigation are a public 
good – nobody can be excluded from it. "e urgency of climate change adaptation varies 
signi#cantly, especially when assessing food security (cf. Cline 2007). Local adaptation 
e!orts may not automatically lead to solutions that could be exported to other areas that 
are also struggling to adapt to the new environmental conditions.  
 V II. CONCLUSION
Prioritising a global relief of su!ering caused by diseases or mitigating climate 
change are very noble goals. However the need of reshaping our incentive system for 
technological innovation in such a way that we can achieve those goals in a reasonable time 
frame should not prevent us from questioning the acceptability of the methods used in the 
process. We, as people participating in society, are still responsible for the institutional 
order that has been set up and that we maintain with our daily habits. As a collective we 
are deciding what is feasible and thus we cannot escape accountability.
We fear that by advocating an incentive mechanism based on the concept behind 
the Health Impact Fund we might implicitly con#rm the moral acceptability of our 
global intellectual property regimes by failing to formally reject it. Even if this addition 
to the patent system is the best thing we could establish under given political realities and 
therefore solely support this type of innovation system to achieve our goals, we are still 
adding to the stability of a system that could be rejected on moral grounds altogether. 
Supporting the patent system in this way might make it harder for future policy makers 
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to combat it. Generally, se%ling for the low minimum global justice commitment the HIF 
suggests, might not be without negative consequences for future policymaking.
Enabling people to participate in the advancement of science cannot be addressed 
solely by corporate social responsibility. We therefore suggest an “innovation inclusion 
clause” to be set in any proposed impact fund. "ere are multiple ways to incentivize 
inclusion, some more restricting, like limiting the availability of rewards to companies 
that have less than a de#ned percentage of scienti#c activities in the developing world 
(something that might bring other problems into existence that have to be addressed 
accordingly). Another way is to reserve a #xed portion of the available funds to help poorer 
companies to overcome the clinical trials hurdle (or the required approval of comparable 
regulatory agencies). Such a clause can still be framed in terms of negative duties: if the 
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